Looking at Presuppositionalism - last show

Well, we ended the four-part series on presuppositionalism recently on the Hellbound Alleee show. And it took us almost two hours. If you want to listen to it, check the archives at http://www.hellboundalleee.com/

I'm afraid I've been derelict in my writing on this blog. There are two main reasons for this. First is that I am starting to see the point of discussing with presuppositionalists less and less. It's obvious that no dialogue was ever started and none ever will. They are not interested in honesty or truth, only in preserving their beliefs. This is no surprise, but the total obliviousness of Manata et al is stunning.

Second reason is that I am working on a new book, with the working title "The Triumph of Materialism Over God". It's about presuppositionalism, materialist apologetics, emergentism, and the human mind. I'm almost done with the third chapter out of five, so it's going pretty well.

Finally, remember to reduce induction. Induction is an epistemic use of the uniformity of nature. Uniformity of nature is an extension of causality. Causality is a corollary of the axioms of identity. Always reduce everything to their foundations.

My point specifically is that uniformity is not non-change. Non-change is non-existence - to exist is to exist in spacetime. We don't make valid claims of induction because concretes don't change, but because of underlying principles. The typical example, "all swans we've seen are white, so probably all swans are white", was correct at the time of its formulation. It was indeed probable that all swans be white. But this is not in fact the case, so the induction is incorrect today. And we know it's wrong, because no underlying principle makes it necessary that swans be white. The "problem of induction" here is not a problem with induction but with our limited knowledge. This applies to all methods, not just induction.

Same for the "grue" example. As I commented, the "grue" scenario is in error because of failing to take into account all the relevant parameters, which is a scenario of either error (forgetting to include) or limited information (not knowing which parameters are relevant). Suppose we have this :

Fact : Grass is "grue" (green until time t, then blue)

t-3) Grass is green
t-2) Grass is green
t-1) Grass is green
Inductive conclusion at t-1 : Grass is green
t) Grass is blue
t+1) Grass is blue
t+2) Grass is blue
Inductive conclusion at t+1 : Grass is blue

Contradiction ? No, not really. It seems like a conclusion because the very fact that grass is grue - which, if true, is observable and knowable - has a bearing on the observed result ! What we should have, without the mistake, is this :

Fact : Grass is "grue" (green until time t, then blue)

t-3) Grass is grue (expressed as green)
t-2) Grass is grue (expressed as green)
t-1) Grass is grue (expressed as green)
Inductive conclusion at t-1 : Grass is grue (expressed as green)
t) Grass is grue (expressed as blue)
t+1) Grass is grue (expressed as blue)
t+2) Grass is grue (expressed as blue)
Inductive conclusion at t+1 : Grass is grue (expressed as blue)

There is no more problem here since grue takes into account both the green and blue expression. Furthermore, we would now know the time t when the causal change occurs due to the grue property.

The point has been made by my esteemed colleagues that "grue" is not a colour in itself, but rather a contradiction, and thus breaks uniformity. I think we might be muddling waters here, and need to introduce the notion of wavelength. Since colours are mental experiences of different wavelengths, this gives us more specific understanding of the scenario.

Does "grue" demand that a specific colour called grue (just like red or orange) change wavelength from 510 nm to 475 nm ? In our reality, colours are attributed wavelengths by conceptualization. So is this what is happening here also ? If so, there would be no break in uniformity at all, although such a change would be undesirable for many reasons.

Or does "grue" demand that the photons emitted by a given object switch from 510 nm to 475 nm, and that is why we call it "grue" - not as a colour but as a change ? In this case, there is, as I commented, no problem of uniformity either. Such change in colour would be knowable through the identity of grass, and we could find out why and when it occurs.